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The Dynamic Advertising Effect of Collegiate Athletics 
 
Abstract 
I measure the spillover effect of intercollegiate athletics on the quantity and quality of 
applicants to institutions of higher education in the United States, popularly known as the 
“Flutie Effect.”  I treat athletic success as a stock of goodwill that decays over time, similar to 
that of advertising.  A major challenge is that privacy laws prevent us from observing 
information about the applicant pool.  I overcome this challenge by using order statistic 
distribution to infer applicant quality from information on enrolled students.  Using a flexible 
random coefficients aggregate discrete choice model—which accommodates heterogeneity in 
preferences for school quality and athletic success—and an extensive set of school fixed effects 
to control for unobserved quality in athletics and academics, I estimate the impact of athletic 
success on applicant quality and quantity.  Overall, athletic success has a significant long-term 
goodwill effect on future applications and quality.  However, students with lower than average 
SAT scores tend to have a stronger preference for athletic success, while students with higher 
SAT scores have a greater preference for academic quality.  Furthermore, the decay rate of 
athletics goodwill is significant only for students with lower SAT scores, suggesting that the 
goodwill created by intercollegiate athletics resides more extensively with low-ability students 
than with their high-ability counterparts.  But, surprisingly, athletic success impacts 
applications even among academically stronger students.   
  2 
 
1.  Introduction 
On a stormy day in November 1984, Boston College and the University of Miami 
played an extraordinary football game.  It was an electrifying shootout, with 1,273 yards of 
total offense and multiple lead changes throughout the game.  However, the final play of the 
game is what has captivated the minds of sports fans all over the United States for decades.  
The score was Miami 45, Boston College 41 and, with only six seconds remaining in the ball 
game, Boston College quarterback Doug Flutie made a miraculous Hail Mary touchdown pass 
to win the game.
1  This game was nationally televised the day after Thanksgiving and thus, 
had a huge viewing audience.  As a result of the win, Boston College qualified to compete in 
one of the New Year’s bowl games, the Cotton Bowl, and finished the season with a 10–2 
record and a top-five AP (Associated Press) Poll ranking.
2  Doug Flutie won the Heisman 
Trophy, the most prestigious individual award in college football, and went on to have a 
successful career as a professional football player and TV analyst. 
  Two years following this extraordinary game, Boston College enjoyed a surge of 
approximately 30 percent in its applications.  Ever since, the popular media have called this 
phenomenon the “Flutie Effect,” referring to an increase in exposure and prominence of an 
academic institution due to the success of its athletics program.  As USA Today described it, 
“Whether it’s called the ‘Flutie factor’ or ‘mission-driven intercollegiate athletics,’ the effect of 
having a winning sports team is showing up at admissions offices nationwide.”
3  
  Boston College is not alone in witnessing a surge of applications due to success on the 
field.  Applications at Georgetown University rose 45 percent between 1983 and 1986, a period 
in which it had tremendous success in men’s basketball, appearing three times in the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) championship finals.  Northwestern University saw a 
                                            
1 A Hail Mary pass is a term used to describe a long forward pass that has a very small probability of success.  It 
usually is called into play toward the end of a game in which it is the only option for winning. 
2 At the time, the schools with the most successful regular seasons were invited to one of five New Year’s bowl 
games: the Cotton, Fiesta, Orange, Rose, and Sugar Bowls.  Multiple polls decide the rankings of schools in college 
football: the AP Poll, the Coaches Poll, the Harris Interactive Poll, etc.  The oldest of these polls, the AP Poll, is 
compiled by sports writers across the United States and is most commonly used to determine the success of a 
particular school’s football season. 
3 Source: “Winning One for the Admissions Office,” USA Today, July 11, 1997. 3 
 
21-percent increase in applications in 1995, a year after winning the Big Ten Championship in 
football. 
More recently, Boise State University enjoyed an 18-percent increase in applications 
after the 2006–07 football season, which it topped off with a win over college football 
powerhouse, University of Oklahoma, in the 2007 Fiesta Bowl to cap a perfect 13–0 season.  
Texas Christian University (TCU), after decades of mediocrity in college football, was able to 
land in the AP Top 25 rankings for the first time in over 40 years in 2000.  Ever since, TCU 
has frequently been in the top of the college football rankings, enjoying media exposure with 
many nationally televised games.  Its admissions office also enjoyed a whopping 105-percent 
increase in applications from 2000 to 2008. 
  However, is the so-called “Flutie Effect” for real?  Boston College’s admissions 
director at that time, John Maguire, does not seem to think so.  “Doug Flutie cemented 
things, but the J. Donald Monan factor and the Frank Campanella factor are the real story,” 
he said, referring to Boston College’s former president and executive vice president.  Maguire 
believes that Boston College experienced a surge in applications in the mid-1980s due to its 
investments in residence halls, academic facilities, and financial aid.  So he claims that the 
“Flutie Effect” was minimal, at best, and did not contribute as much as the popular press 
claimed it had.
4 
  The primary form of mass media advertising by academic institutions in the United 
States is, arguably, through its athletics program.  Therefore, this study investigates the 
possible advertising effects of intercollegiate athletics.  Specifically, it looks at the spillover 
effect, if any, and the magnitude and divergence that athletic success has on the quantity and 
quality of applications received by an academic institution of higher education in the United 
States.  Furthermore, I look at how students of different abilities place heterogeneous values 
on athletic success versus academic quality. 
For many people residing in the United States, intercollegiate athletics is a big part of 
their everyday lives.  During the college football season, it is common to see live college 
football games being broadcast in prime time slots, not only by sports-affiliated cable channel 
                                            
4 Source: “The ‘Flutie factor’ is now received wisdom. But is it true?” Boston College Magazine, Spring 2003. 4 
 
networks (e.g., ESPN and Fox Sports), but also by the major over-the-air networks (ABC, 
NBC, and CBS).
5  Yet, it is surprising to see very limited research in this area. 
McCormick and Tinsley (1987) were the first to examine the possible link between 
athletics and academics.  They find that, on average, schools in major athletic conferences 
tend to attract higher-quality students than those in non-major conferences and that the trend 
in the percentage of conference wins in football is positively correlated with the increase in the 
quality of incoming students.  They hypothesize that intercollegiate athletics has an 
advertising effect and, as a result, suggest that schools with athletic success may receive a 
greater number of applications, thus allowing them to be more selective in admissions.  
Similar to McCormick and Tinsley (1987), Tucker and Amato (1993), using a different time 
frame for the data, find that football success increases the quality of incoming students.  
Using only a single year of school information, these studies rely primarily on cross-sectional 
identification to determine the impact of historical athletic success on the quality of the 
incoming freshman class, essentially ignoring any unobserved school-specific effects that might 
be correlated with athletic success. 
In comparison, Murphy and Trandel (1994) and Pope and Pope (2009), using panel 
data, focus more on short-term episodic athletic success and its impact on academics.  While 
these studies, in aggregate, are able to control for unobserved school-specific effects, by relying 
solely on a descriptive model, they are unable to precisely capture shifts in preferences by 
potential students.  In addition, aside from Pope and Pope (2009), all of the above studies 
ignore any heterogeneous effects of athletics on students of different ability.  Furthermore, 
these studies use institutional-level data, disregarding any specific market-level characteristics 
that would likely affect demand for higher education in different markets.  i.e. both Murphy 
and Trandel (1994) and Pope and Pope (2009) use the aggregate number of applications per 
institution per year as their observation points, while I use market-level (state-level) data to 
infer school preferences for students who reside in different markets.  Moreover, by examining 
only changes in the aggregate, these studies do not account for any heterogeneity in preferences 
                                            
5 ABC’s Saturday Night Football, which broadcasts major college football games live, runs from 8:00 PM to 
12:00 PM on Saturday evenings during the college football season.  More information about the popularity of 
college football is given in the following sections. 5 
 
for athletic success that is likely to exist among high school seniors applying to colleges and 
universities in the United States.  Most importantly, none of the above studies accounts for 
the relative value of athletic success compared to other factors (monetary/psychological costs, 
academic quality, etc.) that determine an applicant’s choice of demand for higher education. 
I distinguish from these studies and treat athletic success as a stock of goodwill that 
decays over time, similar to that of advertising.  Relying on the utility-maximizing behavior of 
high school seniors applying to colleges and universities in the United States, I build and 
estimate a structural model of demand for higher education to determine the effect and 
magnitude that these goodwill stocks can have on the outcome of school admissions.  My goal 
is twofold: to determine if there is, indeed, an advertising spillover effect from athletic success 
and, if so, to identify the magnitude of the effect on the quality and quantity of applications 
and its impact on school selectivity rates.  Furthermore, using market-level data, I examine 
the relative importance of athletic success compared to other factors (academic quality, tuition 
costs, distance from home, etc.) that influence students of different abilities. 
From a modeling perspective, using an extensive set of school fixed effects to control 
for unobserved quality in athletics and academics, I apply a flexible random coefficients 
aggregate discrete choice model to allow for heterogeneity in preferences where athletic success 
shifts school preferences for high school seniors applying to colleges and universities.  A major 
challenge is that privacy laws prevent us from observing information about the applicant pool.  
I overcome this challenge by developing an order statistics based approach to infer applicant 
quality from information on enrolled students. 
Overall, I find that athletic success has a significant impact on the quantity and 
quality of applicants that a school receives.  However, I find that students with lower than 
average SAT scores have a stronger preference for athletic success, while students with higher 
SAT scores have a greater preference for academic quality.  Furthermore, I find that the 
carryover rate of goodwill stocks for athletic success is evident only for students with lower 
SAT scores, suggesting that students of low ability intertemporally value the success of 
intercollegiate athletics more and discount it less than their high-ability counterparts.  In 
addition, I find that when a school goes from being “mediocre” to being “great” on the football 6 
 
field, applications increase by 18.7 percent, with the vast proportion of the increase coming 
from low-ability students.  However, there is also an increase in applications from students at 
the highest quality level.  In order to attain similar effects, a school must either decrease its 
tuition by 3.8 percent or increase the quality of its education by recruiting higher-quality 
faculty who are paid five percent more in the academic labor market.  I also find schools 
become more selective with athletic success.  For the mid-level school in terms of average SAT 
scores, the admissions rate would drop by 5.1 percent with high-level athletic success. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents an overview of collegiate 
athletics and the data used for empirical analysis.  Sections 3 and 4 present the model and 
estimation methodology, respectively.  Section 5 discusses the results and counterfactual 
analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Collegiate Athletics and the Data 
2.1  Collegiate Athletics 
The first college football game was played between Rutgers University and Princeton 
University in 1869.  The last years in which a non-athletic scholarship granting school won a 
major title in college football were in the mid-1940s and early-1950s, with Princeton University 
and the United States Military Academy winning the College Football National Championship 
in 1950 and in 1944–1946, respectively.  In those days, collegiate athletics was used mainly as 
a tool to increase diversity and to boost pride and self-awareness among the student body and 
alumni. 
Things have substantially changed over the past several decades.  While it is still true 
that one of its missions is to increase diversity and morale, today’s collegiate athletics has 
become a multi-billion dollar industry, raking in huge amounts of revenue for the participating 
institutions.  It acts as a huge catalyst in boosting the regional economy and at public 
institutions, it is not uncommon to see the head coaches as one of the highest-paid state 
employees.  As for mere numbers, college football alone topped $2 billion in revenue and $1.1 
billion in profit in 2010, and the single highest revenue-generating institution, the University of 7 
 
Texas at Austin, generated $94 million of revenue in football alone.
6  Nick Saban, the head 
football coach at the University of Alabama, is the highest paid coach, with an annual income 
of close to $6 million.
7  The total fan base for college football is 103 million people, which 
represents approximately one-third of the U.S. population, and 43 percent of U.S. residents saw 
at least one of the 35 post-season bowl games in the 2010–11 football season.
8  I hereafter 
refer to the 2010–11 season as the 2010 season.  The University of Nebraska holds the longest 
home game sell-out streak, dating back to 1962 (306 as of the end of the 2010 football season), 
and the average home game ticket price in the secondary market in 2009 for Ohio State was 
$524, the highest among all schools.  Though not the original goal when intercollegiate 
athletics was first implemented, it has become commercialized and is a significant part of the 
regional economy. 
  To investigate the effect of having a successful athletics program on admissions, I 
utilize multiple datasets.  I compile each dataset to match one of the 120 institutions that 
participates in the NCAA Division 1 FBS (Football Bowl Subdivision). 
  As with professional sports, collegiate athletics has a hierarchy of divisions, with 
Division 1 as its highest level of competition.  Within Division 1 are Division 1 FBS and 
Division 1 FCS (Football Championship Subdivision).
9  Division 1 FBS is the strongest of all 
divisions and is considered as the main division.  Therefore, my analysis focuses only on the 
set of institutions that participate in this division.
10  Figure 1 outlines the subdivisions and 
conferences within Division 1. 
                                            
6 Source: “College football’s $1.1 billion profit,” CNNMoney.com, December, 2010. 
7 Source: “Football Bowl Subdivision coaches salaries for 2010,” USA Today, December, 2010. 
8 Source: “Behind the Numbers: College Football Business Grows Exponentially,” CNBC.com, March, 2011. 
9 These two subdivisions were formerly known as Division 1-A and Division 1-AA.  The key organizational 
difference is that the former relies on bowl games after the regular season to determine the champion while the 
latter determines the champion through a playoff.  The substantive difference is that the former utilizes many more 
resources than the latter and can award up to 85 athletic scholarships, compared to the former’s 63.  Furthermore, 
Division 1 FBS teams have better facilities and a bigger alumni base, which results in larger amounts of 
contributions to support their athletic programs.   
10 While a majority of schools in Division 1 FBS jointly operate both football and basketball programs, there are 
some schools that are considered high-profile basketball programs, which are not part of this division.  e.g., 
Georgetown, Gonzaga, etc. 8 
 
Presently, Division 1 FBS can still be divided into two subdivisions, referred to as the 
AQ (automatic qualifying) and non-AQ conferences (also known as the mid-majors).
11  The 
main difference between them is that the conference champions of the AQ conferences are 
automatically invited to a BCS (Bowl Championship Series) bowl game at the end of the 
regular season, whereas invitations to such bowl games are more difficult to obtain for non-AQ 
conference teams.  Although the definition of success varies according to the school and its 
pre-season expectations, a school is generally believed to have had a successful season if it goes 
to a BCS bowl game.
12  Hence, the AQ conference schools tend to have superior facilities and 
funding and, as a result, attract more talented student athletes to their athletic programs. 
2.2  Data 
The primary data for admissions were collected through the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS), the core of the postsecondary education data collection 
program for the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES).  It contains data on the 
number of applications received, the number of applicants admitted, and the number and 
distribution of SAT scores for students enrolled at each institution of higher education.  In 
addition, to correctly ascertain where the applications come from, I manually collected data 
from the College Board’s (the implementers of the SAT) annual state-level report “College-
Bound Seniors.”  This dataset contains the exact number of SAT score reports sent by high 
school seniors in each state seeking admission to colleges and universities throughout the 
United States.  It also contains the distribution of overall SAT scores by state. 
Institutional characteristics such as average faculty salary, whether the school is a 
public or private institution, size of the student body, total number of faculty, and published 
in-state and out-of-state tuition costs were also collected through IPEDS.  The historical 
number of high school graduates by state for each year over the sample period was collected 
                                            
11 As of December 2010, the AQ conferences (also referred to as the Bowl Championship Series, or BCS, conferences) 
are the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big East Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pacific 
(Pac)-10 Conference, and Southeastern Conference (SEC); the non-AQ conferences are the Conference USA (CUSA), 
Mid-American Conference (MAC), Mountain West Conference (MWC), Sun Belt Conference, and Western Athletic 
Conference (WAC). 
12 Currently, the BCS bowl games are the Rose, Sugar, Fiesta, and Orange bowls, and the BCS National 
Championship Game. 9 
 
through the NCES.  To control for inflation, the history of the consumer price index was 
obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and used to convert any monetary variables 
in the analysis to 2009 U.S. dollars.  The distance from a specific state to an institution was 
manually collected using publicly available software.
13 
Finally, athletic performance data were hand-collected from multiple data sources: 
Wikipedia, STASSEN.COM College Football Information, and Sports-Reference.  As a 
measure of athletic performance, I use the total number of wins per season for the school’s 
football program.  Although slightly different by conference and season, Division 1 FBS teams 
typically play 12 games in a regular season.
14  Bigger conferences, which have sub-conferences, 
hold a conference championship game between the sub-conference champions.
15  After the 
regular season, teams with six or more wins qualify for a post-season bowl game; for each bowl 
game, a bowl committee selects the teams that will participate.  As previously mentioned, the 
conference champions of AQ conferences automatically qualify for a BCS bowl game and the 
two top-ranking teams in the BCS standings play for the BCS National Championship.  Thus, 
the maximum number of games that a team can win is 14, i.e., regular-season games (12) plus 
a conference championship (1) plus a bowl game (1).  I hypothesize that with each additional 
win, a team would receive greater media exposure via TV, newspapers, and other media 
outlets, which would create an advertising effect for the school.  Therefore, I use the total 
number of games won in a season to measure the success of a particular school’s athletic 
performance. 
  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data.  The AQ conference schools tend 
to receive more applications and have larger student bodies.  The difference is clearer for 
private schools, with private schools of AQ conferences receiving twice as many applications as 
their non-AQ counterparts, despite their enrollment being relatively the same.  Private schools 
are generally more selective in both subdivisions (AQ and non-AQ).  They also tend to have 
                                            
13 The web tool Distance From To (http://distancefromto.net) was used to calculate the distances from students’ 
home states to each institution. 
14 Teams that play at Hawaii have the option of scheduling a 13th regular-season game to offset travel costs.  This 
rule, referred to as the “Hawaii Exemption,” also gives the University of Hawaii the option of playing a 13th game. 
15 As of the 2010–11 season, the ACC, Big-12, CUSA, MAC, and SEC have a conference championship game in 
Division 1 FBS.  10 
 
better standards of education quality, with higher average faculty salaries and faculty–student 
ratios.  Consequently, they generally have a propensity for attracting higher-quality students, 
as evidenced by higher average SAT scores.  Overall, the schools in the AQ conferences are 
generally bigger, have higher standards of education, and tend to attract superior students, 
consistent with the results of past cross-sectional studies (e.g., McCormick and Tinsley, 1987) 
that find schools with successful athletics programs tend to attract higher-quality students. 
Model-free analysis 
  Figure 2a shows the aggregate number of high school graduates in the United States 
over the past decade.  There is an upward trend in the number of graduates, mainly due to 
the population increase in that age bracket. 
  To get a glimpse of how athletic success influences admissions, Figure 3a shows the 
number of applications received by the two main public universities in the state of Alabama, 
the University of Alabama and Auburn University.  The reason for choosing these two 
institutions for illustration is that many consider them to be the biggest college football rivals 
in the United States, clashing each year in their historic rivalry game, the Iron Bowl.
16  They 
are both public universities of roughly equal enrollment and academic rankings.  In addition, 
college football is one of the biggest—if not the biggest—attractions in the state of Alabama, 
with the University of Alabama winning the BCS National Championship in the 2009 season 
and Auburn University winning it in the 2010 season.  The early years of this decade are 
referred to as the “dark ages” in Crimson Tide (Alabama’s nickname) football where the school 
had to deal with NCAA sanctions for recruiting violations.  During this period, Alabama also 
lost the Iron Bowl to Auburn seven consecutive years.  The football program was rejuvenated 
in the later years of the decade and has been on the national scene ever since.  It actually was 
during this time frame that Alabama surpassed Auburn in the number of applications received. 
  The most established and well-known institution in college football is, arguably, the 
University of Notre Dame, with 13 recognized national championships under its belt and 96 
                                            
16 There are other big rivalries considered to be equal to the rivalry of Alabama and Auburn; Yale vs. Harvard, 
Army vs. Navy, Ohio State vs. Michigan, USC vs. Notre Dame, Stanford vs. California, Texas vs. Texas A&M. 11 
 
All-Americans and seven Heisman Trophy winners throughout its history.
17  Notre Dame has 
had somewhat of a rollercoaster ride in the past decade in terms of football success.  Table 2 
shows the overall football wins per season for a select number of schools.  One can see that 
Notre Dame did quite well in the 2002, 2005, and 2006 seasons, with ten, nine, and ten wins, 
respectively.  Since football season begins with the start of the academic year in the fall and 
ends with the conclusion of the national championship game in early January, and applications 
for admission are usually submitted between late fall to early spring of the previous academic 
year, the effect, if any, that football success has on the number of applications is anticipated to 
appear the following academic year.
18  Figure 3b shows that Notre Dame had substantial 
increases in the number of applications in 2003, 2006, and 2007, years immediately following 
successful football seasons.  On the contrary, in other years, Notre Dame had only a limited 
increase and, in some instances, a decrease in the number of applications. 
  This phenomenon is not limited to the case of Notre Dame.  Figure 3c shows the 
trend of applications for two large public institutions with rich traditions in football, the 
University of Texas and Pennsylvania State University.  Similar to the application trends of 
Notre Dame, the number of applications for both Texas and Penn State increased significantly, 
immediately following years of football success.  Specifically, there was a huge increase in the 
number of applications for Texas in the year following the BCS National Championship at the 
end of the 2005 football season.  Likewise, there was a huge increase in applications for Penn 
State in the year following its win in a BCS bowl game, the Orange Bowl, at the end of the 
2005 football season. 
  Would this phenomenon hold for smaller schools with less of a history of football 
success prior to the recent decade?  The University of Oregon and the University of West 
Virginia, with their high-tempo powering offenses, have gained popularity among college 
football fans and have enjoyed huge success on the football field during the past decade.  
Figure 3d shows the application trends for both of these schools.  The number of applications 
                                            
17 Source: Wikipedia. 
18 A more detailed description of timing is given in the following section. 12 
 
at both schools has risen substantially over the past decade, with peaks in the years following 
successful football seasons. 
  Finally, to offer a glimpse into what happens when a less sports-affiliated institution 
(member of the non-AQ conference) excels in athletics, Figure 3e shows the number of 
applications for TCU over the past decade.
19  We see a huge increase in applications, far 
greater than the increase in high school graduates shown in Figure 2a.  In the same period, 
unlike its football performance in the previous decades, TCU did quite well on the field, having 
been ranked in the top 10 twice and in the top 25 seven times in the final AP Poll. 
  One thing to consider is that there may have been a national temporal trend in the 
number of applications in the past decade due to record-low interest rates and the federal 
government’s emphasis on postsecondary education.  Figure 2b shows the overall total number 
of applications for 1,277 U.S. institutions that offered associate degrees or above.  The 
aggregate number of applications for these institutions increased substantially.  Figure 2c 
shows the ratio of the number of applications to the total number of U.S. high school students 
over the past decade.  The average number of applications per student steadily increased, with 
1.4 applications per student in 2001 and 1.8 in 2009, possibly due to the macroeconomic 
variables mentioned above. 
To account for this trend and to conduct a more general and conclusive analysis of the 
relation between football success and applications, Figure 4 shows a scatter plot and the best-
fitting nonparametric smoothed polynomial (and its 95 percent confidence interval) of the 
fractional increase in applications (normalized by the total number of applications) against the 
change in the number of wins compared to the previous season.  Normalization was done by 
dividing the number of applications for each institution by the total number of applications in 
a given year to account for macroeconomic temporal changes.  Hence, the y-axis of Figure 4 is 
the fractional increase in the normalized number of applications, specifically, 
                                            
19 TCU was a member of the MWC.  As of July 1, 2012, it became a member of one of the AQ conferences, the 
Big 12. 13 
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to the previous football season.  One can see that when there is no significant change in 
football performance (near zero on the x-axis), changes in the number of applications are 
minimal.  However, when there is a substantial increase in football success (the right side of 
zero on the x-axis), applications increase substantially.  In contrast, when there are negative 
changes in football performance (the left side of zero on the x-axis) there is a decline in 
normalized applications. 
 
3.  Model 
I propose a model of demand for higher education that allows for heterogeneity in 
students’ tastes for school and market characteristics.  I treat athletics and its cumulative 
performance as a stock of goodwill that decays over time but augments with current 
performance, similar to that of advertising.
20  In addition, I use order statistics to infer the 
quality of applicants from the observed distribution of the incoming freshman class and, thus, 
am able to formulate the relative importance of athletic success to students of different abilities. 
Model of application choice conditional on the quality of applicants 
For most high school seniors, the choice of postsecondary education is probably the 
biggest decision they've faced in their young lives.  When a student decides where to apply, 
she is likely basing her decision on factors related to the quality of education, such as the 
quality of the faculty and the faculty–student ratio.  She probably also takes into account the 
opportunity costs of postsecondary education and costs related to attending a particular 
institution.  These costs can be in the form of monetary costs, primarily represented by the 
                                            
20 Numerous studies deal with the long-term and carryover effects of advertising, e.g., de Kluyver and Brodie (1987), 
Givon and Horsky (1990), Dekimpe and Hanssens (1995), Lodish et al. (1995), Bruce (2008), and Rutz and Bucklin 
(2011).  Clarke (1976) and Assmus et al. (1984) compare various models with regard to the long-term effect of 
advertising.   14 
 
cost of tuition, or the psychological costs of being away from home.  Factors such as the 
diversity of the student body and the goodwill created by intercollegiate athletics may also 
affect her decision. 
Let the utility of person i with ability a residing in state s who decides to apply to 
institution j at time t  be represented as 
a
isjt u .  Obviously, the utility obtained from applying 
is not limited to simply “applying” but is more of a continuation value expected from enrolling 
in the school.  Assume that the utility is additively separable between a deterministic 
component and a random component, and, hence, the utility function can be represented as 
aa a T a a a a a T a
isjt k sjkt sjt jt j sjt k sjkt isk p sjt isp isjt
kk
ux p G xp bg x x s n s n e =- + + + D + + + åå , (1) 
where  sjkt x  is the k-th observed characteristic of the market institution-specific vector  sjt x .  I 
define a market as the state in which a high school student currently resides.  
a
j x  is the time 
invariant unobserved (by the econometrician) utility component of j that is common across all 
individuals (with ability a) and across all markets, and 
a
sjt x D  is the time-varying unobserved 
utility component of j that is common across all individuals with ability a in market s at time t.  
The unobserved x  captures difficult-to-quantify aspects, such as prestige, tradition, and 
reputation, that affect the demand of institution j.  
a
isjt e  is the idiosyncratic random shock to 
utility that is assumed to be independently and identically distributed type I extreme value 
across individuals, states, schools and time.  
T
sjt p  is the tuition costs, which are identical 
across markets for private institutions but differ by market for public institutions. Specifically, 
for public institutions, 
, if institution   is in state 
,                        otherwise
T
sjt T
sjt T
sjt
pj s
p
p
ì ï ï ï í =
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, 
where 
T
sjt p  and 
T
sjt p  represent the in-state and out-of-state tuition, respectively.  
a
jt G  is the 
stock of goodwill generated by past and current athletic performance, which takes on the 
process as follows: 
,1
aa a a
jt j t jt GGb A l - =+ ,
      
(2) 15 
 
where  l  is the carry-over rate (1 l -  can be thought of as the decay rate), which is assumed 
to be  01 l << , and  jt A  is current athletic performance, which augments athletic goodwill.  
Recursively solving equation (2) results in,
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I introduce individual-level preference heterogeneity by the sixth and seventh terms in 
equation (1), of which elements of  n  are assumed to be distributed from a standard normal 
distribution.  Hence, the characteristic  sjkt x  factors into the utility function through the mean 
component 
a
ks j k t x b  plus any deviations from the mean 
a
ks j k ti s k x sn  that differ by individuals.  
Similarly, 
aT
sjt p g  represents the mean disutility one gets from tuition expenses, and 
aT
p sjt isp p sn  
represents any deviations from this mean, thus allowing different price elasticities by individual.  
The utility one gets for not applying to college j is given as,
22 
00 0 0 0
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One can think of  0
a
st x  as common shocks within markets that influence choice.  For example, 
in 2005 Hurricane Katrina made it difficult for students in Louisiana to apply to college.  I 
capture individual-level heterogeneity in the value of not applying to school j by the second 
term in equation (4).  Since the market shares in the logit model are a function of the 
differences in utility from the outside option (not to apply to j), naturally, in this formulation 
the random coefficient on the intercept term of the utility of option j captures the 
heterogeneity of the outside option of not applying to j. 
The utility function in equation (1) can be decomposed as 
12 (,,,;) (,,;)
aT a a aT a a a
isjt sjt sjt jt sjt sjt sjt is isjt ux p G x p dx q m n q e =+ +  
   
,
aaa
sjt isjt isjt dme =+ +  
                                            
21 With regards to the identification of the carryover rate : In the data, if a school has more than two periods 
(current + 1st lag) of football performance, one can uniquely identify the marginal effect of football success and the 
carryover rate separately.  If there are more than two periods then these periods would act as over-identifying 
restrictions, hence,  can be more precisely identified. 
22 More precisely, the outside option here would be not applying to one of the 120 universities in Division 1 FBS.  
Thus, deciding to apply to an Ivy League school would be captured by the outside option. 16 
 
where 
aa a
sjt j sjt xx x =+ D and  1 (,,,;)
Ta a a
sjt sjt jt sjt xpG dx q   represents the mean utility, which is 
independent of individual characteristics  1 ( , ,..., )
aa aa
is isp is isK nn nn = , and  2 (,,;)
Ta a
sjt sjt is xp mn q  is the 
individual’s deviations from the mean.  Correspondingly,  11 ( , ,..., , , )
aa a a a a
K b qg bb l =  is the 
vector of parameters that represents the marginal effect on utility for school-state 
characteristics independent from individual characteristics, and  21 ( , ,..., )
aa a a
pK qs ss =  is the 
vector of parameters that is associated with these individual characteristics. 
  By the distributional assumption on the idiosyncratic shocks and the utility 
specification stated above, the probability of individual i with ability a, who resides in state s, 
applying to institution j is given as,
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By integrating over the heterogeneity component, one can obtain the overall proportion of 
students of ability a in state s that applied to j 
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where  ()
a
i h n  is the joint distribution of all of the heterogeneity elements  () 1 , ,...,
aa aa
ii p ii K nn nn =  
for a student with ability a.  Since the above equation involves solving a multidimensional 
integral that has no closed-form solution, one has to rely on simulations to obtain the overall 
application shares. 
 
4.  Estimation 
4.1  Obtaining application shares 
The IPEDS data contain the number of applications received for each institution in a 
given year.  However, they do not contain the market (state) from which these applications 
originate.  Therefore, the application shares (proportion of students in state  s that applies to 
                                            
23 The application decision is assumed to be independent across schools.  This assumption may sound somewhat 
limited.  However, since the cost of applications is extremely small compared to the cost of attendance, this 
assumption is not overly restrictive. 17 
 
j ) are obtained by synchronizing the College Board SAT and IPEDS data, specifically, the 
percentage of SAT scores sent to each institution from each state and the number of 
applications each school received.  I hereafter refer to application shares as the proportion of 
high school students in state s who send an application to a particular institution, formally 
defined as, 
# of high school students from state   that applies to institution 
Total # of high school students (seniors) in state 
sjt
sj
S
s
= . 
Naturally, these shares will not sum to one since an individual may choose to apply to more 
than one school; so the term ‘share’ is somewhat awkward.  The application share can be 
thought of as the proportion of students who consider school j and, hence, apply to j from the 
total number of high school students in state s. 
  The College Board SAT data contain the exact number of SAT score reports sent to 
any institution from a particular state.  Although merely sending one’s SAT score report to a 
school is not the same as applying (but would probably be a superset), once we know the ratio 
of the SAT score reports sent to an institution from a specific state and the number of total 
applications the institution received, we can infer the number of applications coming from a 
particular state for each institution.  Specifically, suppose that there are S markets and J 
institutions.  Let the ratio of SAT score reports sent from students in market s to institution j 
be 
s
j m , formally defined as, 
# students in   who sent SAT scores to 
# total students in   who sent SAT scores
s
j
sj
s
m = . 
In addition, let the total market size (i.e., the total number of high school graduates) of state s 
be 
s M  and the total number of applications received by j be  j A .  Since 
s
j m  reflects the 
popularity (in applications) of school j among students in s, I can obtain the number of 
applications coming from state s for institution j by utilizing this ratio and weighing it by the 
total number of high school students in each state s, such that, 
1
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4.2  Order statistics to infer the quality of applicants 
Federal law protects the data associated with individual information about the 
applicants to each institution of higher education in the United States.
24  Thus, I can obtain 
only the data on the quality of students (SAT scores) for the enrolled student population for 
each academic institution in my sample.  Relying on this information along with the 
admission and enrollment rates, I use order statistics to infer the quality of the applicants.  I 
first assume that each institution stochastically admits the top proportion of applicants.  
Since each institution wants to attract students of higher ability, this assumption does not 
seem all that unreasonable.  I further assume that the bottom proportion of the accepted 
students stochastically decides to enroll, since students with lower ability likely have fewer 
options to choose from. 
Let us suppose that a certain institution admits  1 nk -+ out of  n  applicants 
(where  1 kn ££).  Then, assuming that the school chooses the top  1 nk -+ out of n  
students, we can construct an order statistics distribution from any number of underlying 
distributions.
25  Let  i X  be a random variable that has a cumulative distribution function 
() Fx.  If one were to randomly draw  n  samples from this distribution and arrange them in 
a non-decreasing order, one would obtain the corresponding order statistics  1: 2: : , ,..., nn n n XX X.  
These order statistics are naturally random variables whose distribution is a function of the 
underlying distribution.  Specifically, the cumulative distribution function for the k-th highest 
order statistic is given as 
() ( ) ( ) () {} () {} ::
!
Pr 1
!!
n rn r
kn kn
rk
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F x X x Fx Fx
rn r
-
=
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- å  
and the cumulative distribution function for the combination of the  kn   highest bracket of 
order statistics is given as 
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.
 
                                            
24 In order to obtain individual-level information for applicants (SAT scores), one would need to get permission from 
each academic institution and further from each student who applied to those institutions.   
25 Interested readers can refer to Sarhan and Greenberg (1962), Harter and Balakrishnan (1996, 1997), David (1981), 
Balakrishnan and Cohen (1991), and Arnold et al. (1992). 19 
 
Further, let us suppose that out of the  1 nk -+   admitted, the bottom l students 
stochastically decide to enroll.  Then, similarly, the cumulative distribution function for the l-
th highest order statistic is given as 
() ( )
( )
()() {} ()() {}
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:1 :: ::
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and, likewise, the cumulative distribution function for the 1 l   bracket of order statistics is 
given as 
() () () :1 1: : 1
1
1
l
rn k lnk
r
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l
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=
= å
. 
Using these functions, I can recover the underlying distribution of the applicants’ quality.  
Specifically, assuming that the SAT scores for applicants at institution j are normally 
distributed with mean  j m  and variance 
2
j s , I can match the order statistics distribution that 
best fits the data to recover the underlying distribution of applicants.
26 
I observe the first and the third quartiles of the SAT scores for the enrolled freshmen 
class along with the admission and enrollment rates and, hence, use this information to 
construct a minimum-distance estimator to recover the parameters of the underlying 
distribution function.  For example, suppose that institution j admits 30 percent of its 
applicants and of the 30 percent that are admitted two thirds decide to enroll.  This would 
mean that the top three out of ten applicants are admitted and out of the three that are 
admitted two decides to enroll.  If the first and the third quartiles of the SAT scores are  25 j Q  
and  75 j Q , respectively, then we can find the parameters of the underlying distribution function 
by minimizing the minimum distance estimator  
() () () () () () () () ()
22 2
11 1
25 75 1: : 1 1: : 1 1: : 1 argmin 0.25 0.75 0.5 jj j j lnk lnk lnk QH QH Q H q
-- -
-+ -+ -+
ìü ïï ïï =- + - + - íý ïï ïï îþ
, 
                                            
26 The minimum and the maximum SAT scores are 400 and 1600, respectively.  Thus, in practice, the underlying 
distribution was assumed to come from a truncated normal distribution. 20 
 
where, in the current example,  8 k = , 2 l = , and  10 n = .  Figure 5 shows the graphical 
illustration of this procedure.  Hence, from the distributional information of the enrolled 
students, I can precisely obtain the mass of applicants via their SAT scores. 
I observe the SAT distribution of students in each market and can infer (by equation 
( 6 ) )  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  s t u d e n t s  w h o  a p p l i e d  t o  e a c h  s c h o o l  f r o m  e a c h  s t a t e .   U s i n g  t h i s  
information and having obtained the distribution of the quality of applicants for each school, I 
am able to construct the application shares for any ability level in each market.  In practice, I 
construct the applicant shares by five evenly-divided segments based on the overall SAT score 
distribution.  In constructing the application shares by ability segment, I assume that the 
school’s SAT distribution of applicants is identical across states.  Although this assumption 
seems reasonable for private schools it may be somewhat problematic for public schools.  
However, since most of the applicants for public institutions predominantly come from their 
home state, this assumption would likely not bias the estimates in a severe way.  To illustrate, 
Figure 6 shows the probability distribution of public schools and its composition of students 
(percentage of in-state students).
27  As one can see the majority of the student body for most 
public schools in Division 1 FBS is composed of in-state students.  More than 35% of public 
schools have 90% or more of its students from its home state while only 10% of them have less 
than 70% with none of them having less than 62%.
28   
4.3  Estimation procedure 
I use the generalized method of moments (GMM; Hansen, 1982) to estimate the model 
parameters.  The GMM is a generic method for estimating parameters in an econometric 
model without relying on any distributional assumptions on the statistical error structure.  
Furthermore, the GMM allows us to use instrumental variables to correct for the likely 
correlation between certain variables (e.g., price) and the unobserved errors.  However, in the 
                                            
27 Source: “Percentage of Out-of-State at Public Universities,” CollegeXpress.com. 
28 To further validate this assumption, Figure 7 shows the SAT score (math) distribution for an anonymous mid-size 
east coast public institution for its in-state and out-of-state enrolling students.  Roughly about 10 % of this 
institution’s incoming freshmen class was from out-of-state.  Although, the out-of-state distribution seem to be 
skewed slightly towards the right, there is only a small difference between in-state and out-of-state.  Likewise, the 
difference of SAT scores between in-state and out-of-state students were minimal with average SAT scores 
(math+reading) for in-state and out-of-state students being 1123 and 1139, respectively. 21 
 
current structure, since the unobserved error component enters the share equation in (5) 
nonlinearly, it is not feasible to directly apply the instrumental variables technique.  I 
therefore use the approach of Berry et al. (1995), which has been widely applied in the 
marketing literature (e.g., Sudhir, 2001; Gordon and Hartmann, 2012).
29 
  For the initial values of goodwill  0
a
j G , one can structure a distributional assumption 
and integrate over it or, with a long enough time series in the panel and the belief that the 
carryover rate is relatively small, one can start off with some initial number.  The time series 
of the IPEDS and College Board SAT data in my sample is for nine years (2001–2009) and 
that of the athletics data is for 15 years (1996–2010).  Hence, I have a sufficient amount of 
past athletic performance data and, thus, use the information from the entire history of 
athletic performance to set the initial goodwill stock, specifically as 
0
1
11
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T
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in the estimation procedure. 
4.4  The choice of variables and instruments 
For school characteristics, I use the average faculty salary and the faculty–student 
ratio, variables that are commonly used in the literature to control for the quality of education.  
I use the distance in miles from a student’s home state to an institution for school–market 
characteristics to take into account any psychological and monetary costs of being away from 
home.  Furthermore, I use the annual borrowing rate to account for the opportunity cost of 
postsecondary education. 
I use the number of overall football wins in a season for current athletic performance.  
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the more wins in a season, the more likely the team receives 
greater media exposure; therefore, the number of total wins in a season is a good proxy for 
current athletic success.  The college football season ends in early January, with the final 
game being the BCS National Championship game.  For the teams that do not qualify for the 
post-season bowl games (teams with fewer than six regular season wins), the season ends 
around Thanksgiving Day, with the conclusion of their main rivalry games.  For the teams 
                                            
29 I direct readers to Berry et al. (1995), Nevo (2000, 2001) for details of the estimation procedure. 22 
 
that qualify for a bowl game, the season ends with the conclusion of the bowl game sometime 
in late December or early January, depending on which bowl game the team was invited to 
participate.  Application packets, though they vary by institution and individual, are usually 
submitted around this time for the next academic year.  So for a measure of current athletic 
performance I use the previous academic year’s overall football wins. 
The unobserved (by the econometrician but fully observed by the student and the 
school) time-varying common component  x D , which represents difficult to quantify features, 
may be correlated with tuition.  While it is merely a given fact that, with profit-maximizing 
firms, prices are correlated with  x D , this is somewhat less obvious with educational 
institutions.  It is highly unlikely that tuition is a flexible decision variable that one can 
systematically change over a short period of time.  Nevertheless, I use the previous two years’ 
tuition as instruments for current tuition. 
By using an extensive set of school fixed effects, I am able to capture omitted or 
unobserved characteristics of quality and, thus, partially address the endogeneity problem 
related to athletic success.  However,  x D , which represents time-specific deviations, can be 
endogenous with athletic goodwill.  To further address the endogeneity concern with regard to 
x D  and athletic goodwill G , let us first discuss the possible factors that construct the 
unobserved  x D .  First, one can think of  x D  as any media exposure that is not observed in 
the data.  A successful movie filmed on campus or a special event such as a presidential 
debate would fall into this category.  These events likely occur randomly, so the endogeneity 
problem is probably not a big concern. 
The endogeneity issue is likely to be a problem if we think of  x D  as investments or 
the maturity of investments, such as the opening of a new residence hall or academic facility.  
Since the goodwill stock of athletics is a function of historical athletic success and athletic 
success is likely a function of past investments in athletics, there may be a chance that  x D  
and G  are correlated.  I have several reasons to believe this is probably not the case.  First, 
in most of the schools in my sample, the budgets for athletics and academics are separate, as 
indicated in the report issued by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics in 2009, 23 
 
which finds that presidents of major universities have limited control over the budgets of their 
respective athletic departments.
30  Second, creating a strong athletics program predominantly 
takes a longer time than building facilities.  Thus, even though the decision to invest in 
academic facilities and athletics may be correlated, due to the timing difference in the maturity 
of investments, the endogeneity concern is less severe.  This further reduces the endogeneity 
problem.  Hence, I believe that the endogeneity issue is not a big concern in my model 
specification. 
 
5.  Results 
I begin by showing the results of the static model, where the carryover rate  l  is set 
to zero, and, thus, athletic goodwill is just a linear function of current athletic performance.  
Table 3 shows the results of the static model without individual heterogeneity in taste or 
ability for two model specifications.  These would be the same as an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with the natural log of odds as the 
dependent variable – homogeneous aggregate logit. 
The results show that athletic performance has a significantly positive effect.  Average 
faculty salary, which acts as a proxy for the quality of the faculty, is positive and significant.  
The faculty–student ratio is positive but insignificant, possibly due to limited variations in the 
size of the faculty or the student body; thus, most of the effect will be absorbed by the school 
fixed effects.  Both tuition and distance are negative and significant, implying that students 
receive disutility from both the monetary cost of tuition and the mental cost of being away 
from home.  The interest rate is negative and significant, suggesting that students value the 
opportunity cost with regard to postsecondary education. 
The results of the OLS and 2SLS do not differ much.  The elasticity of tuition 
increases slightly with the use of instrumental variables, but not as much as found in other 
studies, where the magnitude of increase is as much as twofold (e.g., Berry et al., 1995; Villas-
Boas and Winer, 1999).  This probably is due to the fact that tuition may be close to being 
                                            
30 Source: “Quantitative and Qualitative Research with Football Bowl Subdivision University Presidents on the 
Costs and Financing of Intercollegiate Athletics,” Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 2009. 24 
 
exogenous and is not as much of a flexible control variable that schools can easily adjust over a 
short period of time, as prices are for profit maximizing firms. 
To further investigate this and find out if there exists any correlation between the 
number of applicants and tuition, I perform the following regression analysis.  I first regress 
the percentage increase in the share of applications on the percentage increase in tuition.  
Specifically, 
T
sjt sjt sjt pS ak h D= + D+, 
where  () ( ) () 11 sjt sjt sj t sj t SS S S
-- D= -  and  () ( ) () 11
TT T T
sjt sjt sj t sj t pp p p
-- D= - .  If it turns out that the 
coefficient  k  is positive and significant, then tuition is endogenous.  Specifically, there is a 
simultaneity bias.  Furthermore, I regress the lag of the percentage changes in applications on 
changes in tuition to see whether schools adjust tuition levels for positive changes in past 
applications.  Table 4 shows the estimates from both specifications.  The coefficient with 
regard to the percentage change in the share of applicants is insignificant in both models, so 
the similarities between the results of the OLS and 2SLS are probably due to the fact that 
tuition is close to being exogenous in the data. 
  Table 5 shows the results of the static model with heterogeneity in both taste and 
ability.  To allow for heterogeneity in taste for athletic success, I include a random coefficient 
for current athletic performance.  In other words, the goodwill function in equation (1) is 
simply 
aa
jt jt Gb A =  with 
a
Aj ti s A A sn  added on to allow for heterogeneity in taste for athletic 
performance.  More specifically, the model I estimate here is 
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Furthermore, I partition the student population into five evenly-divided segments based on the 
overall SAT scores and construct applicant shares by each market and segment to estimate 
segment level parameters.  The range of SAT scores for the different segments is shown in the 
top row of Table 5a and is presented graphically in Figure 8.  Athletic performance is positive 
and significant for all segments.  The average faculty salary is also positive and significant.  
However, the mean utility parameter for athletic performance is greatest for students with low 
SAT scores and lowest for those with high SAT scores.  The magnitude is as much as three 25 
 
times as large for the lowest-ability segment compared to that of the highest-ability segment, 
implying that athletic success is relatively more important to students with low academic 
ability.  We can clearly see that the relative importance of athletic performance decreases with 
students’ SAT scores, implying that students with higher ability, while somewhat fond of the 
success of a school’s athletic program, are less enthusiastic about it than lower-ability 
students.
31 
With regard to the quality of education, the relative importance of average faculty 
salary, which proxies for the quality of the faculty, increases with SAT scores, indicating that 
the demand for high-quality education increases with students’ academic ability.  The effect of 
the faculty–student ratio, though insignificant for all segments, dramatically increases with 
student ability, which again implies that higher-ability students care relatively more about 
academics than their lower-ability counterparts do. 
The coefficients on tuition and distance are all negative and highly significant.  The 
effect of the interest rate is negative and significant for all segments, with the highest-ability 
segment being the most sensitive.  Although this result may come as a surprise, it makes 
intuitive sense in that students with higher ability probably have a greater opportunity cost 
with regard to postsecondary education.  The heterogeneity parameters are, for the most part, 
insignificant, except for tuition and distance for a number of segments.  Even for the 
significant parameters, the magnitude is negligibly small, showing close to no heterogeneity in 
taste.  It is probably the case that the extensive set of school fixed effects is absorbing most of 
the heterogeneity.  Overall, all students are positively affected by a school’s success on the 
field, even the highest-quality students, surprisingly.  However, the relative importance is 
stronger for students with lower ability. 
  Table 6 shows the results of the dynamic model.  For the dynamic model, I allow for 
heterogeneity only in student ability since the heterogeneity parameters on taste in the static 
                                            
31 An alternative approach to incorporate (continuous) observed heterogeneity would be to draw student quality 
from the observed SAT distribution and interact it with the athletic performance variable, the number of wins.  
The results of this model specification are reported in Table 5b.  The interaction term with regard to SAT scores 
and football success is negative and significant, consistent with the results of the model that incorporates discrete-
level observed heterogeneity.  I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this robustness check. 26 
 
model show that it is negligible.  Athletic performance, once again, is highly significant for all 
segments, with the lowest segment showing a much stronger preference for it compared to the 
higher-ability segments.  The carryover rate l  is significant for only the lower-ability 
segments, implying that athletic goodwill from the previous years remains relevant only to 
students with low ability. 
Counterfactual analysis 
  The natural counterfactual to perform is to determine how significant athletic success 
is in attracting potential candidates to apply to a specific institution.  Table 7a shows the 
“what if” scenario:  What happens if a mid-level school that used to have a mediocre football 
team suddenly performs well on the field, with everything else held constant?
32  I define 
mediocre performance as winning only four games per season in the previous two years and 
performing well as winning ten games per season in the past two years.  Overall, applications 
increase by 18.7 percent when the school has a higher level of athletic success.  However, a 
vast majority of the applicants come from the lower-ability segments.  If a school wanted to 
simply match the increase in the total number of applications without having athletic success, 
it would have to decrease tuition by 3.8 percent or attract better faculty, who would be paid 
five percent more in the academic labor market.  Of course, due to differences in preferences 
for academic quality or athletic success by students of different ability, the composition of the 
increase in applicants will be different, depending on whether it results from lower tuition, 
improved academic quality, or athletic success.  Tables 7b and 7c show the percentage increase 
in applications by students of different ability when the quality of faculty improves and when 
tuition falls, respectively, to equal the increase in applications from success on the field.  One 
can see that the increase in applications is spread more evenly among segments when tuition 
decreases and that improvement in the quality of faculty affects high-ability students more 
than low-ability students.  These findings are in contrast with the effect that athletic success 
has on different ability segments.  Moreover, each additional win for a school results in an 
                                            
32 I define mid-level school as a school with median fixed effects estimates.  27 
 
additional loss to another school.  Hence, this counterfactual exercise potentially 
underestimates the effect of athletic success.
33 
Building upon this analysis, the next apparent counterfactual is to look at how 
athletic success affects the selectivity of schools.  Schools care about selectivity, particularly, 
the admissions rate, since it is used as one of the key evaluation criteria in determining the 
quality rankings of an academic institution.  Tables 8 show the computed admissions rates of 
schools in the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles in accordance with their average SAT scores, 
with low and high athletic success.  Once again, low and high athletic success are defined as 
winning four and ten games per season in the previous two seasons, respectively. 
In computing this counterfactual, I keep the observed (estimated via order statistics) 
school’s admission rates, which are different for each segment, constant.  The logic behind this 
counterfactual is that schools making admissions decisions are not basing their evaluations on 
SAT scores alone.  There are other factors that go into the decision making process, such as 
high school grades and extracurricular activities, and the admissions rate I observe in the data 
for each segment corresponds with this admissions policy.
34  For example, suppose school A’s 
admissions rate in the lowest-ability segment is 15 percent.  This means that, although the 
students in this segment have relatively low SAT scores, 15 percent of them have other 
dimensions of quality (mentioned above) that makes them worthwhile for the school to attract.  
This form of admissions policy takes into account the policies of schools, which sometimes 
require, by state law, to admit students that surpass a certain quality level (not necessarily 
SAT scores).
35  Since I observe (estimated via order statistics) the distribution of applicants 
and admittees, I can compute the actual admissions rates for each segment for each school.  I 
compute the total admissions rates for low and high athletic success, keeping the school’s 
segment-level admissions rates constant. 
                                            
33 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. 
34 This admissions policy is consistent with the assumption with regards to the use of order statistics distribution to 
back out student quality in Section 4.2. 
35 Texas House Bill 588, commonly referred to as the "Top 10% Rule", is a Texas law passed in 1997.  This bill 
guarantees Texas students who graduated in the top 10 percent of their high school class be given automatic 
admission to all state-funded universities. 28 
 
Tables 8 show that both private and public schools gain in selectivity through athletic 
success.  For the median (in terms of average SAT scores) private school, selectivity rates 
improve by 2.1 percentage points, while for the median public school, selectivity rates improve 
by 2.6 percentage points. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Intercollegiate athletics has gained exponential growth in popularity over the past 
several decades and now plays a big part in many people’s lives in the United States.  Colleges 
and universities benefit from intercollegiate athletics in the form of monetary gain through 
ticket and merchandise sales, as well as lucrative television contracts, and in the form of 
advertising through school exposure in multimedia outlets. 
The advertising effect of intercollegiate athletics was first speculated in the years 
following Boston College quarterback Doug Flutie’s infamous game-winning Hail Mary 
touchdown pass against the University of Miami in 1984, when Boston College witnessed a 
substantial increase in its applications.  The mass media thus coined the term “Flutie effect” 
to refer to an increase in the exposure and prominence of an academic institution due to the 
success of its athletics program.  The Flutie effect, though conjectured to be quite large in 
magnitude, surprisingly has not been fully investigated in the academic literature.  This study 
empirically investigates the Flutie effect to determine the relative importance of a school’s 
athletic success compared to other factors influencing the choice of schools for students of 
different abilities. 
To investigate the advertising effect of intercollegiate athletics, I apply a flexible 
random coefficients aggregate discrete choice model and treat athletic success and its 
cumulative performance as a stock of goodwill t h a t  d e c a y s  o v e r  t i m e  b u t  a u g m e n t s  w i t h  
current performance.  I use market-level data to adequately control for different factors that 
affect a student’s choice of postsecondary education at the market level, unlike previous 
research, which relies solely on aggregate data. 
Furthermore, to overcome data limitations due to privacy regulations, I innovate and 
contribute to the broader line of research in discrete choice models by applying the use of an 29 
 
order statistics distribution to infer the quality of applicants from the observed distribution of 
the enrolling freshman class, allowing me to identify different preferences for students of 
different ability. 
Overall, I find that athletic success has a significant impact on the quality and 
quantity of applicants to institutions of higher education in the United States.  However, 
athletic success has relative more importance to the students with lower ability.  On the other 
hand, I find that students of higher ability have a stronger preference for the quality of 
education compared to their lower-ability counterparts.  Furthermore, the carryover rate of 
athletic goodwill is evident only for students with low SAT scores, suggesting that students 
with low ability value the historical success of intercollegiate athletics over longer periods of 
time.  Nevertheless, surprisingly, students with high SAT scores are also significantly affected 
by athletic success. 
In addition, I find that when a school goes from being mediocre to being great on the 
football field, applications increase by 18.7 percent.  To attain similar effects, a school has to 
either decrease its tuition by 3.8 percent or increase the quality of its education by recruiting 
higher-quality faculty who are paid five percent more in the academic labor market.  I also 
find schools become more selective with athletic success.  For a mid-level school, in terms of 
average SAT scores, the admissions rate improves by 5.1 percent with high-level athletic 
success. 
Why would athletic success have any impact on an academic institution’s applications 
for admission?  There may be several reasons.  First, this effect may be due to simply an 
increase in awareness.  There are many academic institutions in the United States and chances 
are that many of them are fairly unknown.  So having a successful athletics program can 
increase the visibility of these institutions to students who have not yet decided on which 
school to apply to.  Even for schools that are fairly well known, the buzz created from 
performance on the field can lead to stories on the evening news and in the sports pages of 
newspapers, which may further increase awareness of these schools. 
One can go a little bit deeper.  Sports are a big part of American culture.  It is 
extremely common for people in the United States to make the sporting events of their alumni 30 
 
institutions the focal point of their social interactions.  Students may find it appealing to take 
p a r t  i n  s u c h  s o c i a l  b o n d i n g  o v e r  s p o r t s  t o  m a k e  t h e m  f e e l  a s  t h o u g h  t h e y  a r e  a  p a r t  o f  
something special, something bigger than themselves.  This can lead to a virtuous cycle of 
improvements in alumni engagement about the school, translating into donations and help 
with job placements for current students, which in turn leads to greater school success.  
Although, not addressed in the current analysis, the question of ‘why’ students value 
intercollegiate athletics can be an exciting venue for future research. 31 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Total  AQ  Non-AQ 
    Public Private Public Private Public Private 
No. of applications 
13,797 15,184 17,139 18,971 9,841 9,907
(8,434) (8,298) (8,478) (7,436) (6,433) (6,319)
Size of undergraduate 
population 
20,636 9,517 23,833 9,632 16,851 9,356
(8,111) (6,381) (7,578) (3,478) (7,017) (8,976)
Admission rate 
0.69 0.43 0.67 0.37 0.72 0.51
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19)
Enrollment rate 
0.48 0.39 0.46 0.37 0.50 0.41
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19)
No. of faculty 
1,074 829 1370 935 723 681
(556) (364) (552) (361) (293) (312)
Faculty salary 
70,265 86,477 75,629 89,303 63,914 82,539
(18,407) (18,051) (17,385) (20,735) (17,542) (12,414)
Faculty–student ratio 
0.05 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.10
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
SAT scores 
1,117 1,306 1,167 1,326 1,057 1,278
(95) (95) (77) (89) (80) (96)
* Years 2001 – 2009, for 120 schools participating in Division 1 FBS.  Standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Overall football wins per season, selective schools 
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Notre  Dame  9 5  10 5 6 9 10 3 7
Penn  St.  5 5 9 3 4 11 9 9  11
Texas  9 11 11 10 11 13 10 10 12
Oregon  10  11 7 8 5 10 7 9  10
West  Virginia 7 3 9 8 8 11 11  11 9
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Table 3: Homogeneous aggregate logit 
   OLS  2SLS 
 Interest  rate  
-0.234*** -0.237*** 
(0.021) (0.021) 
  Average faculty salary   
0.042*** 0.042*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 Faculty–student  ratio  
0.636 0.660 
(1.040) (1.052) 
 No.  of  wins  
0.019*** 0.019*** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 Distance  
-0.034*** -0.034*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 Tuition  
-0.155*** -0.157*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Testing for endogeneity 
Dependent variable 
Percentage change 
in tuition 
Percentage change 
in tuition 
Model type  Model 1  Model 2 
Constant 
0.050*** 0.046*** 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Percentage change 
in applications 
-0.007   
(0.006)   
Percentage change 
in applications (lag) 
   0.002 
   (0.009) 
    *** p < 0.01. 
 
  35 
 
Table 5a: Parameter estimates, static model 
        seg1 seg2 seg3 seg4 seg5 
  
SAT score range 
0 - 
837 
837 - 
973 
973 -   
1090 
1090 -   
1225 
1225 -   
1600    
1 
 Constant  
-3.179*** -2.810*** -2.667*** -2.537*** -2.270***
(0.340) (0.244) (0.225) (0.224) (0.271)
 Interest  rate  
-0.139*** -0.192*** -0.221*** -0.252*** -0.316***
(0.035) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
 Average  faculty 
salary  
0.046*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
 Faculty-student 
ratio  
-1.650 -0.469 0.015 0.474 1.307
(1.918) (1.411) (1.265) (1.217) (1.369)
 #  Wins  
0.035*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
 Distance  
-0.030*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.045***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
 Tuition  
-0.154*** -0.153*** -0.156*** -0.161*** -0.179***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
2 
 Constant  
0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013
(4.481) (2.644) (2.454) (2.396) (3.276)
 Interest  rate  
0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.427) (0.244) (0.222) (0.218) (0.303)
 Average  faculty 
salary  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016)
 Faculty-student 
ratio  
0.012 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.010
(6.605) (4.545) (3.981) (3.874) (4.890)
 #  Wins  
0.011 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011
(0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
 Distance  
0.015*** 0.011 0.013** 0.011 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
 Tuition  
0.011 0.011** 0.012** 0.011** 0.015***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
*** p< 0 .01, ** p < 0.05. 
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Table 5b: Parameter estimates, alternative static model 
1  2 
Constant 
-2.659***
Constant 
0.013 
(0.222) (2.456) 
Interest rate 
-0.235***
Interest rate 
0.010 
(0.022) (0.221) 
Average faculty salary 
0.041***
Average faculty salary 
0.000 
(0.002) (0.008) 
Faculty–student ratio 
0.503
Faculty–student ratio 
0.009 
(1.251) (2.512) 
No. of wins 
0.030***
(SAT)×(No. of Wins) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Distance 
-0.038***
Distance 
0.014 
(0.003) (0.008) 
Tuition 
-0.159***
Tuition 
0.014*** 
(0.003) (0.005) 
*** p < 0.01; SAT scores are scaled by 0.01, i.e., SAT score of 1,600 would be 1.6. 
 
 
Table 6: Parameter estimates, dynamic model 
    seg1 seg2 seg3 seg4 seg5 
SAT score range 
0 - 
837 
837 - 
973 
973 -   
1090 
1090 -   
1225 
1225 -   
1600 
 Interest  rate  
-0.148*** -0.199*** -0.227*** -0.256*** -0.319*** 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
  Average faculty salary   
0.046*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Faculty-student  ratio  
-1.465 -0.313 0.164 0.612 1.542 
(1.817) (1.802) (1.805) (1.808) (1.818) 
 Distance  
-0.024*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.041*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Tuition  
-0.154*** -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.160*** -0.176*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 #  Wins  
0.034*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.014** 0.014** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 Carry-over  rate  
0.466*** 0.524*** 0.534** 0.535 0.487 
(0.117) (0.214) (0.226) (0.314) (0.399) 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. 37 
 
Table 7: Percentage increase in applications by segment 
a.  Four wins per season vs. ten wins per season 
   seg1 seg2 seg3 seg4 seg5 
% Increase 
in applications 
34.38 22.96 17.42 8.93 8.67 
 
b.  Five percent increase in mean faculty salary 
   seg1 seg2 seg3 seg4 seg5 
% Increase 
in applications 
20.37 16.30 16.29 17.02 21.24 
 
c.  3.8 percent decrease in tuition 
   seg1 seg2 seg3 seg4 seg5 
% Increase 
in applications 
17.95 17.74 18.19 18.81 20.73 
 
 
 
Table 8: Selectivity (admissions rate), four vs. ten wins per season 
School 
Low-success High-success 
Total Private  Public Total Private  Public 
25th percentile  82.0% 68.1% 85.3% 80.2% 66.1%  83.5% 
50th percentile  55.5% 39.7% 77.5% 52.7% 37.7%  74.9% 
75th percentile  59.2% 20.6% 65.6% 56.3% 18.8%  63.0% 
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Figure 1: NCAA Division I subdivisions and conferences 
 
* As of December 2010. 
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Figure 2: Trends for high school graduates and applications 
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Figure 3: Applications, select schools 
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Figure 4: Applications and changes in the number of wins 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of SAT scores (mass) 
   
Figure 6: Distribution of the Percentage of In-State Students  
for Division 1 FBS Public Schools 
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Figure 7: SAT Score (Math) Distribution of an Anonymous Mid-size Public 
Institution for In-state and Out-of-state Enrolling Students 
 
 
Figure 8: Segmentation based on SAT scores 
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